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<title><![CDATA[Can a Board of Medicine Use the State’s Prescription Drug Database in Investigating Physician Actions?]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[
 
 
 
 
  <div align="left"> <i><b><font face="Arial">And where do patients' rights stand?</font></b></i><br></div><div align="left"><br></div><div align="left"><font face="Arial">According to a California appellate court, the California Board of Medicine can use a patient's record from the state's controlled substances drug database to build its case against a physician. But, on September 17, 2014, the California Supreme Court granted the appeal of the decision in <i>Alwin Carl Lewis v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Medical Board of California, Real Party in Interest)</i>, 226 Cal. App. 4th 933 (May 2014). Opening briefs on the merits are due to the Supreme Court of California by January 16, 2015.</font><br></div><div align="left"><font face="Arial"><font size="2"><br></font></font><style> .linkcolorchange A:link {color: #edad27; text-decoration: underline}.linkcolorchange A:visited {color: #edad27; text-decoration: underline}  .linkcolorchange A:active {text-decoration: underline}  .linkcolorchange A:hover {text-decoration: underline; color: #edad27;} </style><table style="text-align: left; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" class="linkcolorchange" align="left" border="0"><tbody><tr><td style="border: 1px solid #edad27; padding:3px;" color="#FFFFFF" size="3" bgcolor="#001c31" valign="top"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font color="#FFCC00"><b><i>A few preliminary comments....</i></b></font><font color="#FFFFFF">The Medical Boards of each state wield enormous authority over the license of a physician. And this is understandable because the Boards are entrusted, in part, with protecting the public. The aggregation of data, whether it be through a controlled substances prescription database or <a href="https://melniklegal.com/programs/weblog.cgi?showpage=1397881440_Big-Data">big data analytics of the type being undertaken in the hunt for Medicare fraud</a>, is empowering regulators and giving them a better understanding of physician practices as well as how the practices of the one physician compares to the practices of many physicians. Further, as we see a move towards the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact and the prospect of greater data sharing among the various Boards, the adverse findings of one Board of Medicine against a physician will surely impact the physician's licenses in other states.<br><br>At the same time, based on the Appellate Court's description of the circumstances in this case, patients are left with very little choice or recourse with respect to the sharing of their controlled substances prescription records. As the Court described, the Board sent releases to six of Dr. Lewis's patients to obtain their medical records, but only obtained signed released from three of the patients. For two of the patients, the Board obtained the medical records after an administrative subpoena. (It's not clear what happened with the medical records of the sixth patient.) It is possible that the two patients whose records were subpoenaed did not provide releases because they, for whatever reason, did not want to participate in the process. Is it really proper for the Board to issue administrative subpoenas for the medical records of patients who (1) were not the ones that filed a complaint, (2) failed to return a release and therefore may not have wanted to participate in the process, particularly when three of Dr. Lewis's patients voluntarily released their records to the Board? Was the Board investigating the doctor or the patients? Moreover, there is no way for patients to opt-out of the </font></font></font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font color="#FFFFFF"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font color="#FFFFFF">prescription drug database programs</font></font></font>--the only way patients can opt-out is to not fill their prescriptions. That doesn't seem like a true choice for patients.<br></font></font></font></td></tr></tbody></table><br><font face="Arial"><font size="3"><br></font></font><div align="left"><font face="Arial"><font size="3">The case revolves around Dr. Alwin Carl Lewis. The investigation began in 2008 when one of Lewis's patients complained to the Board of Medicine (Board) regarding his advice that "she lose weight and start a diet that the [she] considered to be unhealthful."<font size="2">[1]</font> During the investigation, the Board ran reports on the provider's prescribing history in the Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (CURES) from November 1, 2005, through November 25, 2008, and from December 16, 2008, through December 16, 2009. After reviewing his history, the Board sent releases to six of Dr. Lewis's patients to obtain their medical records. Three of the patients signed the releases voluntarily, and the medical records for two other patients were obtained via an administrative subpoena.<font size="2">[2]</font></font></font><br><br><font face="Arial"><font size="3">In its complaint against Dr. Lewis, the Board accused Dr. Lewis of a number of violations with respect to his treatment of the patient that filed the complaint as well as his treatment of the additional patients whose medical records were subpoenaed. After an eight day hearing, the Administrative Law Judge "concluded that Lewis engaged in unprofessional conduct by failing to maintain adequate records" with respect to the patient that filed the complaint and "that two of Lewis's patients had been overprescribed controlled substances during a short period of time."<font size="2">[3]</font></font></font><br><br><table border="0"><tbody><tr><td align="left" valign="top"><font face="Arial"><font size="3">Dr. Lewis appealed the Board's decision to the trial court. Specifically, "Lewis argued the Board violated his patients' informational privacy rights under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution by accessing CURES during the course of an investigation unrelated to improper prescription practices, and also violated their rights not to be subjected to unwarranted searches and seizures."<font size="2">[4]</font><br><br>The trial court decided for the Board and Lewis then filed an appeal to the Appellate Court.</font></font></td><td align="left" valign="top"><font face="Arial"> </font><font face="Arial"><img src="https://melniklegal.com/images/prescription_drugs_polariod.jpg" height="213" width="311"></font><br></td></tr></tbody></table><br><div align="left"><font face="Arial">Dr. Lewis phrased the issue for review as follows:</font><br><blockquote><font face="Arial">[W]hether the Medical Board of California is permitted to conduct searches, without any showing of any kind-whether good cause, reasonable suspicion, or some other similar standard-and without warrant or subpoena-of the controlled substances prescription records of patients throughout the State, via the State's computerized Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System.<font size="2">[5]</font></font><br></blockquote><font face="Arial">As the Appellate Court clarified:</font><br><blockquote><font face="Arial">&nbsp;[T]he challenge to CURES appears to be based upon the protections of the Fourth Amendment, but Lewis makes clear that he is asserting his patients' right to informational privacy in their controlled substances prescription records. Lewis has standing to assert his patients' right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. . . Lewis's constitutional attack is narrowly focused on the Board's access to his patients' CURES data during an investigation unrelated to improper prescription practices without patient consent or prior judicial approval upon a showing of good cause.<font size="2">[6]</font></font><br></blockquote><font face="Arial">In upholding the lower court decision, the California Appellate Court discussed the landscape of California and Federal regulations surrounding CURES and the California privacy laws. The Court agreed that medical records deserve protection--"[t]he state of a person's gastro-intestinal tract is as much entitled to privacy from unauthorized public or bureaucratic snooping as is that person's bank account, the contents of his library or his membership in the NAACP."<font size="2">[7]</font> Similarly, the Court found that prescription records are also entitled to protection and "a patient who has obtained a prescription for a controlled substance has a legally protected privacy interest in unwarranted public disclosure and unauthorized access to information contained in [the CURES] records."<font size="2">[8]</font> But, just because people have an expectation of privacy, does not mean that the right is absolute because "other factors may affect a person's reasonable expectation of privacy."<font size="2">[9]</font> As the Appellate Court explained:</font><br><blockquote><font face="Arial">There is a diminished expectation of privacy in controlled substances prescription records maintained in CURES. Contrary to Lewis's contention, it does not follow that a patient's expectation of privacy in his or her controlled substances prescription records is the same as the expectation of privacy in medical records. Unlike medical records, prescriptions of controlled substances are subject to regular scrutiny by law enforcement and regulatory agencies as part of the pervasive regulation of controlled substances. A reasonable patient filling a prescription for a controlled substance knows or should know that the state, which prohibits the distribution and use of such drugs without a prescription, will monitor the flow of these drugs from pharmacies to patients. Pharmacies are required to maintain records of prescriptions filled for controlled substances and present them to authorized officers of the law without a warrant. A pharmacist also has a statutory obligation to provide data of controlled substances prescriptions to the Department of Justice on a weekly basis for electronic monitoring in CURES. This well-known and long-established regulatory history significantly diminishes any reasonable expectation of privacy against the release of controlled substances prescription records to state, local, or federal agencies for purposes of criminal, civil, or disciplinary investigations.<font size="2">[10]</font></font><br></blockquote><font face="Arial">Further, the Appellate Court found that the Board's access to the CURES records for disciplinary purposes was permitted by statute and the Board has statutory obligations to maintain the privacy and security of the CURES records. Further, "there is no contention that the Board publicly disclosed Lewis's patients' information to third parties or failed to protect the confidentiality of the CURES data it received during the course of its investigation."<font size="2">[11]</font> As a result, "although there are no penalties in CURES for unwarranted public disclosure," given the other statutory protections in place, the fear that "the Board will publicly disclose CURES data obtained during the course of a licensee-physician investigation does not constitute a serious invasion of privacy."<font size="2">[12]</font></font><br><br><font face="Arial">The Appellate Court also found that a warrant as dictated by the Fourth Amendment was not required because a "warrantless search of a 'closely regulated' business is deemed reasonable if certain criteria are met" and the criteria were met in this case because the CURES statute provided sufficient notice.<font size="2">[13]</font> Further, the statue places limits on the Board investigators because "[a]ccess to CURES data is limited to state and federal agencies for civil, criminal, and disciplinary purposes. Thus, under the statutory scheme, the physician and patient know who is authorized to receive CURES data and under what narrow circumstances."<font size="2">[14]</font></font><br><br><font face="Arial">Finally, the Appellate Court concluded that the Board's access to the patients' records was justified because it had substantial interest in:</font><br><ul><li><font face="Arial">"controlling the diversion and abuse of controlled substances";</font></li><li><font face="Arial">"protect[ing] the public against incompetent, impaired, or negligent physicians" and Board access prohibited doctors from stalling or otherwise impeding the Board from retrieving records when investigating the physicians.<font size="2">[15]</font></font></li></ul><font face="Arial">Further, the nature of the complaint against a physician should not stand to limit when the Board can access the CURES database because "a physician's prescribing practices are directly related to medical care and treatment afforded to his patients."[16] As a result, the Appellate Court appears to conclude that access to CURES data is relevant in any Board investigation against a physician where a complaint is lodged. The Appellate Court found no violation of </font><font face="Arial"><font size="3">article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.</font></font><br><br><u><b><font face="Arial">To check on the status of this case:</font></b></u><br><ul><li><font face="Arial">Go to: <a href="https://www.courts.ca.gov/10029.htm">https://www.courts.ca.gov/10029.htm</a></font></li><li><font face="Arial">Click on the Search Case Information button</font></li><li><font face="Arial">Enter case no. S219811 and click on the Search by Case Number button</font></li></ul></div></div><font size="2">-------------------------------------<br><font face="Arial">[1] <i>Alwin Carl Lewis v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Medical Board of California, Real Party in Interest)</i>, 226 Cal. App. 4th 933, 939. (May 2014).<br><br>[2] <i>Id</i>. (It is not clear whether the Board obtained the medical records of the sixth patient. Dr. Lewis had no standing to challenge the release of the medical records from the patients who signed the releases.)<br><br>[3] </font></font><font size="2"><font face="Arial"><font size="2"><font face="Arial"><i>Id</i>.</font></font><br><br>[4] <i>Id</i>.<br><br>[5] <i>Id</i>. at 940-42.<br><br>[6] <i>Id</i>. (<i>emphasis added</i>)<br><br>[7] <i>Id</i>. at 946.<br><br>[8] <i>Id</i>. at 947.<br><br>[9] <i>Id</i>. <br><br>[10] <i>Id</i>. at 948-49 (internal quotations and citations omitted).<br><br>[11] <i>Id</i>. at 949.<br><br>[12] <i>Id</i>. at 949 - 951.<br><br>[13] <i>Id</i>. at 952.<br><br>[14] <i>Id</i>. at 953.<br><br>[15] <i>Id</i>. at 955.<br><br>[16] <i>Id</i>.<br></font></font><font size="2"><font face="Arial"><font size="2"><font face="Arial"><br></font></font></font></font><font size="2">-------------------------------------<br><br><font face="Arial">Posted by Tatiana Melnik on November 30, 2014</font><br></font></div>    
 
 
 
 
 
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<link>http://melniklegal.com/weblog/1417375549_Privacy.html</link>
<guid>http://melniklegal.com/weblog/1417375549_Privacy.html</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 30 Nov 2014 14:25:49 EST</pubDate>
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<title><![CDATA[Eligible Professionals May Apply for a Hardship Exception from Meaningful Use Penalties]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[
 
 
 
 
     <div align="left"><div><table border="0"><tbody><tr><td align="left" valign="top"><font face="Arial">As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Congress mandated that payment adjustments be applied to Medicare eligible professionals (EPs) who are not meaningful users of Certified EHR Technology under the Medicare EHR Incentive Programs.<br><br>Medicare EPs who are not meaningful users will be subject to a payment adjustment beginning on January 1, 2015.<br><br>But, exceptions are available under certain limited circumstances.<br></font></td><td valign="top"><img src="https://melniklegal.com/images/Meaningful_Use_Hardship.jpg"><br></td></tr></tbody></table><font face="Arial"><b><br>Which practitioners are subject to MU payment adjustments and when do the payment adjustments begin?</b></font><br></div><div><ul><li><font face="Arial">EPs who participate in the Medicare EHR Incentive Program.</font></li><li><font face="Arial">EPs who can participate in <i>either</i> the Medicare or Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs.</font></li><li><font face="Arial">These payment adjustments will be <font color="#006600"><b>applied beginning on January 1, 2015</b></font>, for Medicare EPs.</font></li></ul></div><div><font face="Arial"><b>Which practitioners are NOT subject to MU payment adjustments?</b></font><br><ul><li><font face="Arial">Medicaid EPs who can only participate in the Medicaid EHR Incentive Program and do not bill Medicare.</font></li></ul><p><b><font face="Arial">How much are the payment adjustments and how are they applied?</font></b></p><p><font face="Arial">The payment adjustment will be applied to the Medicare physician fee schedule (PFS) amount for covered professional services furnished by the EP during the year (including the fee schedule amount for purposes of determining a payment based on the fee schedule amount). <br></font></p><p><font face="Arial">The payment adjustment is 1% per year and is cumulative for every year that an EP is not a meaningful user. Depending on the total number of Medicare EPs who are meaningful users under the EHR Incentive Programs after 2018, the maximum cumulative payment adjustment can reach as high as 5%.</font><br></p></div><font face="Arial">For additional details on MU payment adjustments, <a href="https://melniklegal.com/av/PaymentAdj_HardshipExcepTipSheetforEP_2013.pdf">please see the Payment Adjustments and Hardships Exceptions Tipsheet for Eligible Professionals released by CMS</a>.<br><br><b>Are there any </b></font><font face="Arial"><b><b><font face="Arial">payment adjustment </font></b>exceptions available for Medicare EPs who cannot meet MU deadlines?</b><br><br><b>Yes</b>. EPs who cannot meet MU deadlines may be eligible to receive a hardship exception from CMS. But, CMS has explained that </font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">these exceptions will be granted only under specific circumstances and only if </font></font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">CMS determines that providers have demonstrated that those circumstances pose a significant barrier to their achieving meaningful use.<br><br>Hardship exceptions are available in the following categories:<br></font></font></font><div><ul><li><font face="Arial"><b>Infrastructure </b>- EPs must demonstrate that they are in an area without sufficient internet access or face insurmountable barriers to obtaining infrastructure (e.g., lack of broadband).</font></li><li><font face="Arial"><b>New EPs</b> - Newly practicing EPs who would not have had time to become meaningful users can apply for <u><i>a 2-year limited exception</i></u> to payment adjustments. Thus EPs who begin practice in calendar year 2015 would receive an exception to the penalties in 2015 and 2016, but would have to begin demonstrating meaningful use in calendar year 2016 to avoid payment adjustments in 2017.</font></li><li><font face="Arial"><b>Unforeseen Circumstances</b> - Examples may include a natural disaster or other unforeseeable barrier.</font></li><li><font face="Arial"><b>Patient Interaction</b> - Lack of face-to-face or telemedicine interaction with patients; Lack of follow-up need with patients.</font></li><li><font face="Arial"><b>Practice at Multiple Locations</b> - Lack of control over availability of CEHRT for more than 50% of patient encounters</font><br></li></ul></div><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">CMS will be providing additional details on the requirements and application process in the future.</font></font><br><br><br><br><br></font></div>    
 
 
 
 
 
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<link>http://melniklegal.com/weblog/1387148396_Meaningful-Use.html</link>
<guid>http://melniklegal.com/weblog/1387148396_Meaningful-Use.html</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 15 Dec 2013 17:59:56 EST</pubDate>
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<title><![CDATA[FTC Targets a Medical Biller, Settles with Accretive Health for Privacy Violations]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[
 
 
 
 
     <div align="left"><font face="Arial">Accretive Health, Inc., a company providing medical billing and revenue management services to hospitals throughout the US. </font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">Accretive </font>"has agreed to settle Federal Trade Commission charges that its inadequate data security measures unfairly exposed sensitive consumer information to the risk of theft or misuse." This settlement follows a settlement between Accretive and the Minnesota Attorney General for HIPAA violations.<br></font><br><div><font face="Arial"><a href="#take">[Jump to Take-a-Ways]</a></font><br></div><br><table style="border: 0px solid red;"><tbody><tr><td><table border="0"><tbody><tr style="font-family: Arial;" align="center"><td><font size="3"><font size="2"></font></font><table style="text-align: left; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" border="0"><tbody><tr><td valign="top"><font size="3"><u><i><b><font size="3">Minnesota </font>Action</b></i></u><br><br>The </font><font size="3"><font face="Arial">Accretive </font>saga started in July 2011, when "an Accretive employee left an unencrypted laptop containing sensitive information on 23,500 Minnesota patients of two Minnesota hospital systems . . . in a rental car after 10 p.m." and the laptop was stolen. [1] (See my brief discussion of this case in the </font><font size="3"><font size="3">October issue of Nephrology News &amp; Issues back in 2012 - "<a href="https://melniklegal.com/av/2012_Nephrology_News_HIPAA_Breach_Dialysis_Providers_pt2.pdf"><i>HIPAA: Privacy, Security &amp; the Consequences of a Breach for Dialysis Providers - Part 2: Recommendations to Minimize Exposure to Data Breach-Related Liabilities</i></a>" <font size="2">(PDF)</font>.) (According to the FTC Press Release, while there were 23,500 patients, the laptop contained 20 million pieces of information.)<br><br></font>The laptop contained sensitive patient information, including the </font><font size="3"><font size="3">patient’s name, address, date of birth, and Social Security number, as well as </font>highly sensitive patient information, including "a checklist to denote whether the patient has 22 different chronic medical conditions and, if so, the condition of the patient [including] three mental health conditions (depression, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia) [and] HIV." [2]<br><br>The Minnesota State Attorney General was particularly concerned about&nbsp;</font><font size="3"><font size="3">Accretive's involvement in the revenue cycle, its "aggressive" debt collection practices, and lack of disclosure to patients. As the AG described: "Accretive has told Wall Street investors that its revenue cycle operations contract starts 'when a patient registers for future service or arrives at a hospital or clinic for an unscheduled visit' and ends when 'the hospital has collected all the appropriate revenue from all possible sources.' Through these contracts, Accretive controls the revenue functions of the hospitals, including front office (patient access), middle office (billing), and back office (collections) functions. It reports to Wall Street investors that it carries out these functions using 'data mining,' 'consumer behavior modeling,' and 'propensity to pay' algorithms."</font></font><font size="3"><font size="3"><br></font></font><br><font face="Arial" size="3"><font size="3">The AG filed suit in the United States District Court in Minnesota, alleging that Accretive violated state and federal health privacy laws, state debt collection laws, and state consumer protection laws. The AG sought "It seeks an order requiring Accretive to fully disclose to [Minnesota] patients: (1) what information it has...; (2) what information it has lost...; (3) where and to whom it has sent information about [the] patients; [and] (4) the purposes for which it amasses and uses information about Minnesota patients."<br></font></font></td><td style="border: 1px solid #edad27; padding:3px;" bgcolor="#001c31" valign="top" width="300px"><font color="#FFFFFF" size="3"><u><b>A Few Highlights<br></b></u></font><font color="#FFFFFF"><br><font size="3">- The matter came to light in 2011 when an unencrypted laptop containing detailed patient data was stolen out of an employee's car.</font><i></i><br><br>- As a result of this incident, Accretive was investigated by both the Minnesota Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission.<br><br>- During the investigation, several practices came to light, including Accretive's lack of HIPAA compliance and its aggressive healthcare debt collection practices.<br><br>- The Minnesota AG brought an action pursuant to the HIPAA enforcement authority granted to AGs by the HITECH Act. Accretive is a business associate of a covered entity and, per the HITECH Act, direct enforcement against business associates is permitted.<br><br>- The Minnesota AG settled with Accretive in 2012. The settlement required Accretive to cease operations in Minnesota and banned the company from doing business in Minnesota for at least 2 years.<br><br>- The FTC brought an action based on Section 5 of the FTC Act, alleging that, Accretive Health created unnecessary risks of unauthorized access or theft of personal information.<br><br>- The FTC's action tracks the requirements of HIPAA, and sets forth additional requirements with respect to Accretive's subcontractors.<br><br>- The OCR is unlikely to take any action against Accretive.</font></td></tr></tbody></table></td></tr></tbody></table></td></tr></tbody></table><div><br><font face="Arial" size="3"><font size="3"><font face="Arial" size="3"><font size="3">The lawsuit also asked "Accretive to disclose whether it has sent health data about Minnesota patients to its so-called 'Shared Services Blended Shore Center of Excellence' in New Delhi, India."<br><br></font></font>Unlike previous State AGs that sought to take action against those who lost patient data, the Minnesota AG relied, at least in part, on the authority grated to state AGs by the HITECH Act to take enforcement action against covered entities and business associates that violated the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules. [3] This case was also the first example of an enforcement action against a business associate.</font></font><br><br><font face="Arial" size="3"><font size="3">The case came to end in July 2013, when Accretive settled wit the </font></font><font face="Arial" size="3"><font size="3"><font size="3">Minnesota </font>AG. Compared to the settlements often entered into by the HHS Office of Civil Rights, the Minnesota AG settlement was relatively harsh. Under the settlement, Accretive agreed to "cease all operations in Minnesota within ... 90 days, or by November 1, 2012.&nbsp; The company [was] then be subject to an outright ban on operating in Minnesota for two years, after which, for the next four years, it can only reenter the State if the Attorney General agrees to a Consent Order regarding its business practices in the State." [4]</font></font><br><br><div><u><i><b><font face="Arial">The FTC Action</font></b></i></u><br><font face="Arial"><br></font><div><font face="Arial">The FTC Action against Accretive stems from the same incident: the loss of the unencrypted laptop.<br></font></div><font face="Arial"><br>The FTC brought an action on its enforcement authority under the Section 5 of the FTC Act, prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." [5] In the Complaint, the FTC alleged the following violations:<br></font><blockquote><font face="Arial">Until at least July 2011, Accretive failed to provide reasonable and appropriate security for consumers' personal information it collected and maintained by engaging in a number of practices that, taken together, unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers' personal data to unauthorized access. Among other things, Accretive Health <i>created unnecessary risks of unauthorized access or theft of personal information by</i>:<br></font><blockquote><font face="Arial"><b>a. </b>Transporting laptops containing personal information in a manner that made them vulnerable to theft or other misappropriation; <br><br><b>b. </b>Failing to adequately restrict access to, or copying of, personal information based on an employee's need tor information; <br><br><b>c.</b> Failing to ensure that employees removed information from their computers for which they no longer had a business need; and <br><br><b>d.</b> Using consumers' personal information in training sessions with employees and failing to ensure that the information was removed from employees' computers following the training. [6]</font></blockquote></blockquote><font face="Arial">The behaviors that the FTC identifies as creating "unnecessary risks of unauthorized access or theft" generally align with the types of behaviors that the Office of Civil Rights finds problematic.<br><br><b>Excerpts from the FTC Consent Order</b><br><br>In the Consent Order, the FTC sets forth a number of requires Accretive must undertake:</font><br><blockquote><font face="Arial">[E]stablish and implement, and thereafter maintain, or continue to maintain a comprehensive information security program reasonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected from or about consumers. Such program ...shall contain administrative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to respondent's size and complexity, the nature and scope of respondent's activities, and the sensitivity of the personal infonnation collected from or about consumers, including:<br></font><blockquote><font face="Arial">(1) The designation of an employee or employees to coordinate and be accountable for the information security program</font>;<br><br><font face="Arial">(2) The identification of material internal and external risks to the security, confidentiality and integrity of personal information that could result in the unauthorized disclosure, misuse, loss, alteration, destruction, or other compromise of such information, and the assessment of the sufficiency of any safeguards in place to control the risks. At a minimum, this risk assessment should include consideration of the risks in each relevant area of operations, including but not limited to: (a) employee training and management; (b) information systems, including network and software design, information processing, storage, transmission, and disposal; and (c) prevention, detection, and response to attacks, intrusions, and other system failures;<br><br>(3) The design and implementation of reasonable safeguards to control the risks identified through risk assessment and regular testing and monitoring of the effectiveness of the safeguards' key controls, systems, and procedures;<br><br>(4) The development and use of reasonable steps to select and retain service providers capable of appropriately safeguarding personal information they receive from respondent, and requiring service providers by contract to implement and maintain appropriate safeguards; and<br><br></font><div><font face="Arial">(5) The evaluation and adjustment of the information security program in light of the results of the testing and monitoring required by [this Order], any material changes to operations or business arrangements, or any other circumstances that Defendant knows or has reason to know may have material impact on the effectiveness of the information security program. [7]</font><br></div></blockquote></blockquote><div><font face="Arial">The FTC's consent order mirrors some of the HIPAA requirements, including, for example, undertaking a risk assessment, develop appropriate measures to address issues identified in the risk assessment, and designate a responsible individual. But, this Order also imposes additional requirements with respect to subcontractors that are beyond what is required by HIPAA, in that the Order requires for the "development and use of reasonable steps to select and retain service providers capable of appropriately safeguarding personal information they receive from" Accretive. Under HIPAA business associates are only required to obtain "reasonable assurances" in the form of a written agreement. As such, the FTC's language seems to suggest a requirement of more than a written agreement.</font><br></div><font face="Arial"><br>Like other FTC orders, this one too is in effect for a period of 20 years.<br><br><u><i><b>Where is the Office of Civil Rights?</b></i></u><br><br>The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is unlikely to take any action against Accretive as a result of the data breach. P</font><font face="Arial">art of the reason that the HITECH Act specifically extended enforcement authority over business associates was to overcome</font><font face="Arial"> an interpretation released by the Department of Justice many years ago that HHS lacked direct enforcement authority over business associates.<br><br>Leon Rodriguez, the Director of OCR, has previously stated that the OCR will not be taking enforcement actions against business associates until after HHS releases the revised HIPAA Rules (revised pursuant to HITECH) and the Rules come into effect. The HIPAA Omnibus Rule was not released until January 2013 and the compliance period came into effect in September 2013. But, the Accretive breach happened in July 2011. This may explain why the FTC Order tracks HIPAA so closely.<br><br></font><div><font face="Arial"><b><font face="Arial"><a name="take">Take-a-Ways</a></font></b></font><br></div></div></div><div><br><div><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">There are a number of legal take-a-ways from the FTC's latest action.</font></font><br></div><div><ul><li><font face="Arial">The FTC Consent Order requirements may track HIPAA requirements, including undertaking a risk assessment.</font></li></ul><ul><li><font face="Arial">The FTC appears to be requiring Accretive to undertake some sort of vetting process of subcontractors to ensure that they are "</font><font face="Arial">capable of appropriately safeguarding personal information they receive from" Accretive, in addition to entering into business associate agreements.<br></font></li></ul><ul><li><font face="Arial">In some respects, it would have been better for Accretive if it was OCR that brought an action because OCR's resolution agreements are generally for about 5 years. But, the FTC's agreement is for 20 years.<br></font></li></ul></div><div><font face="Arial">Similar to the recent action by<a href="https://melniklegal.com/programs/weblog.cgi?showpage=1388165329_HIPAA"> OCR against Adult &amp; Pediatric Dermatology, P.C., a dermatology practice delivering services in Massachusetts and New Hampshire</a>, this is another breach that could have been avoided with the use of encryption on portable devices, including laptops.&nbsp; </font><br></div></div><font face="Arial"><br>-----------------<font face="Arial" size="2"><br>[1] Press Release</font><font face="Arial" size="2">, Minnesota Attorney General, Attorney General Swanson Sues Accretive Health for Patient Privacy Violations: Debt Collector Lost Laptop Containing Sensitive Data on 23,500 Minnesota Patients, <a href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/pressrelease/120119accretivehealth.asp">https://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/pressrelease/120119accretivehealth.asp</a> (last visited Jan. 2, 2014). <br><br>[2] Id.<br><br>[3] </font><font face="Arial" size="2"><font face="Arial" size="2"><a href="https://melniklegal.com/av/2012_accretive_health_minn_ag_complaint.pdf">Complaint, State of Minnesota by its Attorney General Lori Swanson v. Accretive Health, Inc.</a>, Civil File No. ___ (D. Minn. Jan. 19, 2012) ("Count 1: Violations of HIPAA. Accretive is business associate of both Fairview and North Memorial as defined in HIPAA. <i>See, e.g.</i>, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. Because HITECH Section 13401 (42U.S.C. § 17931) provides that 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308, .310, .312 and .316 apply to a business associate of a covered entity in the same manner as they would to a covered entity, Accretive is thus subject to the security provisions contained within HIPAA as well as applicable civil and criminal penalties.")</font><br><br>[4] </font><font face="Arial" size="2"><font face="Arial" size="2"><font face="Arial" size="2">Press Release</font><font face="Arial" size="2">, Minnesota Attorney General, Attorney General Swanson Says Accretive Will Cease Operations in the State of Minnesota Under Settlement of Federal Lawsuit, Cannot Reenter Minnesota For Six Years Without Attorney General’s Agreement, <a href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/pressrelease/07312012accretiveceaseoperations.asp">https://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/pressrelease/07312012accretiveceaseoperations.asp</a> (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).<br><br></font></font>[5] <i>In the Matter of Accretive Health, Inc.</i>, FTC Complaint, Docket No. ___ (File. no. 122 3077) (Dec. 31, 2013), <i>available at </i><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-and-proceedings/cases/122-3077/accretive-health-inc">https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-and-proceedings/cases/122-3077/accretive-health-inc</a>.<br><br>[6] Id. at para. 6<br><br>[7] </font></font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial" size="2"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial" size="2"><i>In the Matter of Accretive Health, Inc.</i>, FTC Order, Docket No. ___ (File. no. 122 3077) (Dec. 31, 2013), <i>available at </i><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-and-proceedings/cases/122-3077/accretive-health-inc">https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-and-proceedings/cases/122-3077/accretive-health-inc</a>.<br><br></font></font>FTC's Press Release - <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/accretive-health-settles-ftc-charges-it-failed-adequately-protect">https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/accretive-health-settles-ftc-charges-it-failed-adequately-protect</a>. <br></font></font></div><div align="left"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"> </font>&nbsp; </font></div>    
 
 
 
 
 
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<link>http://melniklegal.com/weblog/1388685990_Privacy.html</link>
<guid>http://melniklegal.com/weblog/1388685990_Privacy.html</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2014 13:06:30 EST</pubDate>
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<title><![CDATA[Interest in Cyber Security of Financial Services Firms Continues to Increase]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
     <table align="left" border="0"><tbody><tr><td align="left" valign="top"><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial">As news of data breaches continue to mount, federal and state regulators are becoming increasingly interested in the steps companies are taking to secure the information entrusted to them by consumers as well as other companies. This year we have seen an increased focus on the financial services sector, which suffered large losses in the wake of the data breach at Target. This was then followed by data breaches at Neiman Marcus, Michaels, PF Changs, among many many others.</font></font></td><td align="left" valign="top"><font face="Arial"> </font><font face="Arial"><img src="https://melniklegal.com/images/1407508517.jpg"></font><br></td></tr></tbody></table><div align="left"><br><font face="Arial">Some of the recent examples include:</font><br><ul><li><div><font face="Arial"><b>FFIEC</b> - The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council has launched a pilot program to assess the cyber security preparedness of 500 community banks. This announcement coincides with the launching of a web page on <font color="#009900"><b>June 24, 2014</b></font> on cyber security, which is meant to serve as "a central repository for current and future FFIEC-related materials on cyber security."
  As the FFIEC explains, "Regulators are particularly focusing on risk 
 management and oversight, threat intelligence and collaboration, 
 cyber security controls, service provider and vendor risk management, and
  cyber incident management and resilience."<font size="2">[1]</font></font></div></li></ul><ul><li><div><font face="Arial"><b>New York Department of Financial Services</b> - In <font color="#009900"><b>May 2014</b></font>, the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) issued a "Report on Cyber Security in the Banking Sector." 
 The Report notes that, "Although large-scale denial-of-services attacks 
 against major financial institutions generate the most headlines, 
 community and regional banks, credit unions, money transmitters, and 
 third-party service providers (such as credit card and payment 
 processors) have experienced attempted breaches in recent years."<font size="2">[3]</font> After conducting a preliminary survey of 154 financial services institutions in 2013, the Department now "plans to expand its IT examination procedures to focus more fully on cyber security." These "revised
  examination procedures will include additional questions in the areas 
 of IT management and governance, incident response and event management,
  access controls, network security, vendor management, and disaster 
 recovery." Those providing services to these entities should also expect to see more questions regarding cyber security now that regulators are becoming more interested in vendor practices.</font><br></div></li></ul><ul><li><font face="Arial"><b>SEC</b> - Cyber security has been a focal point at the Securities and Exchange Commission for a few years. But, the SEC's Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations announced in a Risk Alert on <font color="#009900"><b>April 15, 2014</b></font> that it is undertaking cyber security examinations of more than 50 registered broker-dealers and registered investment advisers.</font><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font size="2">[2]</font></font> The OCIE will be focusing on the entity’s cyber security governance, identification and assessment of cyber security risks, protection of networks and information, risks associated with remote customer access and funds transfer requests, risks associated with vendors and other third parties, detection of unauthorized activity, and experiences with certain cyber security threats.</font><br></li></ul></div><div align="left"><br><font face="Arial"><font face="Arial"><font size="2">---------------------------------------</font></font></font><br><font face="Arial"><font size="2">[1] Press Release, FFEIC, FFIEC Launches Cybersecurity Web Page, Promotes Awareness of Cybersecurity Activities, June 24, 2014, <a href="https://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr062414.htm">https://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr062414.htm</a>.</font></font><br><br><font face="Arial"><font size="2">[2] SEC, National Exam Program Risk Alert, Vol. IV, Iss. 2 (April 15, 2014), <a href="https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/Cybersecurity+Risk+Alert++%2526+Appendix+-+4.15.14.pdf">https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/Cybersecurity+Risk+Alert++%2526+Appendix+-+4.15.14.pdf</a></font></font>.<br><br><font face="Arial" size="2">[3] NY State Department of Financial Services, </font><font face="Arial" size="2"><font face="Arial">Report on Cyber Security in the Banking Sector (May 2014),</font> <a href="https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr140505_cyber_security.pdf">https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr140505_cyber_security.pdf</a></font>.<br><font face="Arial"><font size="2">---------------------------------------</font></font><br><br><font face="Arial"><font size="2">Posted by Tatiana Melnik on August 8, 2014</font></font><br></div>
 
 
 
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<link>http://melniklegal.com/weblog/1407508168_Financial-Services.html</link>
<guid>http://melniklegal.com/weblog/1407508168_Financial-Services.html</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 08 Aug 2014 10:29:28 EST</pubDate>
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<title><![CDATA[And the Data Breach Train Keeps Rolling]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[
 
 
 
 
     <div align="left"><font face="Arial" size="3">In the last few days, two hospitals have announced data breaches involving protected health information.</font><br><br></div><table align="left" border="0"><tbody><tr><td align="left" valign="top"><font face="Arial" size="3">The first data breach incident, announced on October 1, 2013, involved St. Mary's Janesville Hospital, a 50-bed facility serving residents of Rock County Wisconsin.</font><font face="Arial" size="3"> <br><br>According the press release posted on the facility's website:<br></font><ul><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>Circumstances</b></u>:</font><font face="Arial" size="3"> Laptop was stolen from an employee's car</font><font face="Arial" size="3"><br></font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><b><u>Incident date</u></b>: August 26 or 27, 2013</font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>When discovered (by hospital)</b></u>: August 27, 2013</font><font face="Arial" size="3"><br></font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>How discovered</b></u>: Presumably when employee notified hospital <br></font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><b><u>Patient notification date</u></b>: September 30, 2013</font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>Public notice date</b></u>: October 1, 2013</font></li></ul></td><td valign="top"><font face="Arial" size="3"><a href="https://www.stmarysjanesville.com/News/Pages/StatementfromStMarysJanesvilleHospital.aspx"><img src="https://melniklegal.com/images/1381256830.jpg"></a></font></td></tr></tbody></table><div align="left"><ul><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>Number of patients' impacted</b></u>: 629</font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>When/where patients' received treatment</b></u>: Patients who were treated in the emergency department of St. Mary's Janesville Hospital between January 1, 2013 and August 26, 2013 <br></font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>Stolen information included</b></u>: May have included patient name, date of birth, medical record and account numbers, provider and department of service, bed and room number, date and time of service, visit history, complaint, diagnosis, procedures, test results, vaccines, if administered, and medications.&nbsp; <i>The laptop did not contain any Social Security numbers, addresses, credit card numbers, or financial information of any kind</i>.</font></li></ul><font face="Arial" size="3">St. Mary's advised in its press release that the hospital "inspected all laptops to ensure they all have encryption software" and that the hospital "will actively be monitoring consistency of laptop encryption and conducting monthly audits to ensure compliance with [the hospital's] encryption policies." But, given this public notice and the notification to patients, it appears that the stolen laptop was either not encrypted or that the PHI was stored in the unencrypted portion of the laptop.</font><br><br><font face="Arial" size="3">St. Mary's has partnered with ID Experts to provide the impacted patients with identity theft monitoring services for one year.</font><br><br><div align="left"><font face="Arial" size="3">The second data breach incident was announced on October 2, 2013 by UnityPoint Health, a healthcare system providing services throughout Iowa and Illinois. According to the UnityPoint's press release (which appears to have been released to the media, but which could not be located on the system's website at https://unitypoint.org):</font><br><font face="Arial" size="3"><ul><li><b><u>Circumstances</u></b>: 
 UnityPoint's electronic medical record (EMR) system was accessed by an 
 unauthorized individual using the login details from authorized 
 individuals</li><li><b><u>Incident date</u></b>: Records accessed over a period from February 2013 - August 2013</li><li><u><b>When discovered (by hospital)</b></u>: On or around August 8, 2013</li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>How discovered</b></u>:
  Incident discovered during a "regular audit", when "UnityPoint detected
  a pattern of unusual access to certain patient data in its hospital EMR
  system"</font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><b><u>Patient notification date</u></b>: Sometime on or before October 2, 2013</font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>Public notice date</b></u>: October 2, 2013</font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>Number of patients' impacted</b></u>: 1,800</font></font></li></ul></font></div><div align="center"><font face="Arial" size="3"><p><font face="Arial" size="3"><a href="https://melniklegal.com/av/20131002_unitypointbreach.pdf"><img src="https://melniklegal.com/images/unitypoint_databreach.jpg"></a></font></p></font></div></div><div align="left"><ul><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b><u><b>When/where patients' received treatment</b></u></b></u>: Patients treated at UnityPoint Health system offices/locations anytime prior to when UnityPoint "shut off the unauthorized access by forcing a password reset"</font></li></ul></div><div align="left"><ul><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><u><b>Stolen information included</b></u>: Names, home addresses, dates of birth, medical and health insurance account numbers, and health information related to patient treatment. For less than ten percent of impacted patients, patient Social Security number and/or Driver’s License number may have been viewed. For four impacted patients, the unauthorized user also accessed information about the patients’ financially responsible party.</font></li></ul></div><p align="left"><font face="Arial" size="3">UnityPoint is offering credit monitoring services to the impacted individuals.</font><font face="Arial" size="3"><br></font></p><div align="left"><font face="Arial" size="3">Materials</font><br><ul><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><a href="https://melniklegal.com/av/20131002_unitypointbreach.pdf">Press Release from UnityPoint Health</a></font><font face="Arial" size="3"> (retrieved from the <a href="https://siouxcityjournal.com/news/local/sioux-city-patients-affected-by-hospital-data-breach/article_d65a99d0-d256-5074-b090-f0f51a62b1c8.html">Sioux City Journal here</a>)</font></li><li><font face="Arial" size="3"><a href="https://www.stmarysjanesville.com/News/Pages/StatementfromStMarysJanesvilleHospital.aspx">Press Release from St. Mary's Janesville Hospital</a></font></li></ul></div>    
 
 
 
 
 
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<link>http://melniklegal.com/weblog/1381882384_Data-Breach.html</link>
<guid>http://melniklegal.com/weblog/1381882384_Data-Breach.html</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 15 Oct 2013 20:13:04 EST</pubDate>
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